About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 55
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Marguerite Bolger

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Marguerite Bolger found that there was no fair issue to be tried and was not satisfied that the impugned procedure had “gone so irremediably wrong” that any conclusion reached adverse to the plaintiff would be bound to be legally unsustainable.

John Rogers SC and Michael Devitt BL appeared for the plaintiff, and Feichín McDonagh SC and Mark Curran BL appeared for the defendant.

Background

The plaintiff, a fifth-year medical student, experienced some difficulty completing his modules in early 2025 due to medical issues. He successfully remediated three modules, but encountered issues with a module requiring inter alia a four-day placement in a GP practice.

The plaintiff alleged that the relevant module coordinator, Dr Clendennen, was unwilling to engage with him and failed to identify a new placement for him.

On 13 May 2025, the plaintiff and his father attended at Dr Clendennen’s office without an appointment. The plaintiff claimed that he “perceived disgust in the manner with which Dr Clendennen regarded my father and me” and that she stated that the plaintiff should not return to her office again. A security incident report was filed that day in relation to that incident.

As they were departing from the Health Sciences building, the plaintiff’s father received a phone call from Professor Cullen, Dr Clendennen’s superior. The plaintiff and his father then attended a meeting with Prof Cullen. In the early hours of 14 May 2025, the plaintiff informed Prof Cullen by email that he intended to make a formal complaint against Dr Clendennen as he believed that she was prejudiced against him.

The plaintiff was informed that the incident would be referred to Student Engagement, Conduct, Complaints and Appeals (SECCA), due to an alleged breach of the university’s code of conduct. An incident report completed by Prof Keane, Dean of Medicine, alleged that the plaintiff was in breach of the student code for obstructive, disruptive or reckless behaviour and violent, abusive, threatening, offensive or unacceptable behaviour, in particular, harassment.

On 13 August 2025, the plaintiff was invited to attend a student conduct meeting by the Dean of students, being the first informal stage of the student discipline procedure.

The plaintiff instituted proceedings on 9 September 2025 alleging that the disciplinary procedure was invoked mala fides against him in retaliation for his intention to make a complaint against Dr Clendennen, and further alleging bias and a failure to give his complaints of bullying and harassment precedence over the disciplinary procedure.

The student conduct meeting was restrained by an ex parte order pending the hearing before Ms Justice Bolger.

The High Court

Ms Justice Bolger explained that the plaintiff had eventually been accommodated in his GP placement and was continuing his academic career, but noted his concerns about the power of the Dean of Studies to temporarily suspend a student following a misconduct meeting pursuant to the disciplinary procedure, “a potentially very serious step that could have dramatic consequences for a student”.

Turning to the issue of bias, the judge explained that the plaintiff was concerned by the appointment of Dr Last as nominee to conduct the disciplinary procedure, where Dr Last was inter alia a subordinate of Prof Keane, a colleague of other persons involved in the complaint and had collaborated on various academic papers with them over the years.

In this regard, the plaintiff relied upon Burke v O’Longain [2025] IECA 148, in which the Court of Appeal found that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Ms Justice Bolger was unconvinced that the mere existence of the collegiate research relationship between Dr Last and the persons who referred the complaint about the plaintiff “does not come to the level of evidence as existed in Burke where the cogent and rational link between the decision maker and the issues that were to be decided was established”.

The judge continued: “I do not consider the relationship, in itself, would satisfy an informed objective person of the existence of bias. Such a person would determine that the fact of collegiate research relationship between Dr Last and the person who made complaint does not establish bias, particularly in the absence of any suggestion of Dr Last having had any involvement in the incident of 13 May or any recent involvement in the School of Medicine.”

As to the plaintiff’s contention that the disciplinary procedure was invoked against him in retaliation for his raising concerns about his treatment by Dr Clendennen, as evidenced purportedly evidenced by the timing of events combined with a reference by Prof Keane to his mental health.

The court observed that as appeared from the incident report filed on the day of the incident with Dr Clendennen, concern had been expressed about the incident before the plaintiff informed Prof Cullen that he considered he had been badly treated by Dr Clendennen.

The court further observed that the plaintiff and his father had raised issues about his mental health with the university prior to Prof Keane’s reference to them, including in an application for extenuating circumstances made by him in March 2025 and in a meeting in early May 2025 in which plaintiff’s father advised Prof Cullen of his concern that the plaintiff may harm himself and that he was afraid to leave him alone.

As to the argument that the university’s bullying and harassment procedure should have proceeded before the disciplinary procedure, Ms Justice Bolger considered that the plaintiff’s position “presupposes an overlap of two procedures that could not apply here where one procedure is against the plaintiff as a student and the other is a complaint by him against an academic”.

The judge continued: “Regardless of the outcome of the plaintiff’s bullying and harassment complaint against a member of the academic staff, it could not lead to an invoking of the student misconduct procedure which is what the disciplinary procedure is.”

The court highlighted that in any event, both procedures expressly recognised that it would be a matter for the university to determine which procedure should take precedence in terms of which might proceed first.

The court also expressed concerns about a failure on part of the plaintiff to make full disclosure relating to his bullying and harassment complaints, in particular, that the part of his complaint as against Prof Cullen was put on hold as he refused to consent to the disclosure of matters relating to the disciplinary procedure.

Ms Justice Bolger considered that any injunction in relation to disciplinary procedures must comply with what the Supreme Court held in Rowland v An Post [2017] 1 IR 355, in that the court should not interfere with disciplinary procedures prematurely unless the impugned flaws are incapable of being remedied within the procedure.

The court was not satisfied that the impugned procedure had gone so irremediably wrong that any conclusion reached adverse to the plaintiff would be bound to be legally unsustainable.

Finding that there was no fair issue to be tried and that matters were not irremediably flawed, Ms Justice Bolger explained that if she was wrong, then in relation to the balance of convenience and the least risk of injustice, the court agreed with the plaintiff that damages were not an adequate remedy.

Nonetheless, the judge determined that the least risk of injustice required that the disciplinary procedure, which was still at an early stage, should be allowed to continue.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court refused the reliefs sought.

Khimji v University College Dublin [2026] IEHC 55