About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 71
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Nessa Cahill

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Nessa Cahill in dismissing the appeal as being entirely artificial and unmeritorious, found that “if section 62 requirements cannot be treated as forgivable omissions under section 64A, it is not apparent to me what omissions are addressed by that provision”.

Background

The appellant resided at an apartment in Waterford city since 9 July 2019 pursuant to a lease of the same date.

The landlord delivered a termination notice dated 25 July 2023 to the property on 3 September 2023 by handing it to the appellant’s son.

The appellant was served with a warning notice for rent arrears on 23 October 2023. The landlord then delivered the termination notice the subject of the appeal on 27 November 2023.

On 29 November 2023, the appellant applied to the respondent alleging breaches of the landlord’s obligations and challenging the validity of the termination notice. The landlord also applied to the respondent claiming rent arrears, breach of tenant obligations and alleged a failure to maintain the property.

An adjudication took place in June 2024, in which it was determined that the termination notice dated 25 July 2023 was invalid, that the November 2023 termination notice was valid and that the property should be vacated, and that the landlord must pay €3,000 in damages for breaches of landlord obligations including the carrying out of necessary repairs and that the appellant must be rent arrears of €8,761.75.

The appellant appealed that determination before a Tenancy Tribunal and in December 2024, a determination issued which inter alia upheld the validity of the November 2023 termination notice. In this regard, the Tribunal found that the omission of the landlord’s signature from the notice constituted a ‘slip’ within the meaning of s.64A of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 and did not prejudice the appellant or the termination notice.

An unusual feature of the case was that the termination notice was in fact signed, but the second page of the notice which contained the signature had not been before the Tribunal.

The appellant issued an appeal on a point of law in January 2025, querying whether the Tribunal was ultra vires and erroneous as a matter of law to determine that the apparent failure by the landlord to sign the termination notice was a slip or omission which did not render the notice invalid within the meaning of s.64A of the 2004 Act.

The appellant also brought five additional grounds of appeal, including inter alia that the Tribunal gave inadequate reasons for its finding that the landlord’s apparent failure to sign the termination notice was a slip or omission, challenging the finding that she had not been prejudiced, and challenging the signature on the termination notice as being inauthentic.

The High Court

Having addressed the applicable legislation and the relevant jurisprudence, Ms Justice Cahill firstly considered the relevance of the missing signature page on the termination notice.

Noting that as the appeal was one on a point of law, it was limited to the facts and evidence before the Tribunal, the court had regard to Deely v. The Information Commissioner [2001] 3 IR 439 in holding that the test to be applied was whether there was evidence to support the findings made by the Tribunal and whether the inferences or conclusions that the omission was a “slip” were ones which no tribunal could reasonably have reached.  

Highlighting that the Tribunal defended the appeal on the basis of the incomplete documentation which was actually before it at the time of its decision, Ms Justice Cahill found: “This gives rise to a situation of significant artificiality: the Appellant’s point of law is that the Tribunal erred in forgiving an omission, but it is now apparent on appeal that the omission did not actually occur.”

The judge continued: “I have a fundamental doubt as to the meritoriousness of any appeal grounded on such a technical point, which is based on a perpetuation of the myth that the notice was not signed. I do not see that it is a good use of the resources of the parties or the court to assess whether a false hypothesis justified the invocation of section 64A.”

On the scope of s.64A, the court explained that a slip in a notice of termination will not of itself render the notice invalid if the slip does not prejudice in a material respect the notice of termination, and that the notice of termination is otherwise in compliance with the 2004 Act.

The court outlined the appellant’s contention that the section could not be used to excuse the omission of a signature or other “core” requirement of the legislation arising from s.62 of the 2004 Act.

Applying Heather Hill Management Company CLG & McGoldrick v an Bord Pleanala [2024] 2 IR 222, Ms Justice Cahill was satisfied that there was no basis from the text of the section to read in any more prescriptive language or more extensive conditions.

The judge explained: “There is nothing in those sections to indicate the criteria of section 62 cannot be derogated from.”

As to whether the Tribunal correctly applied s.64A, the court recognised that the formulation of s.64A is “slightly curious” as it asks whether a notice of termination was prejudiced, rather than a person being prejudiced.

Nonetheless, the judge was satisfied that when read in the context of s.64A as a whole, the provision was clearly intended to ensure that an omission or slip does not materially undermine a notice, “such as by preventing it from fulfilling its intended purpose in a material respect”.

As to the contention that the appellant was prejudiced by the notice, the court noted: “Even if prejudice to the tenant was the intended test in section 64A(a) (which I do not believe to be the case), I can see no basis for interfering with the decision of the Tribunal that no prejudice was caused to the Appellant by the want of a signature.”

In this regard, the court highlighted inter alia that in any event, the argument of prejudice was “utterly unstateable” given that the appellant was in fact in possession of a signed termination notice at all material times.

Ms Justice Cahill was further satisfied that there was no evidence or suggestion that the notice was not otherwise in compliance with the 2004 Act.

As to the alleged inadequacy of reasons, the judge emphasised that there was a “pronounced artificiality to the contention that the Tribunal did not sufficiently reason a decision which it did not need to make, and which the Appellant at all material times knew was not required”.

Nonetheless, the court determined that the Tribunal did give adequate reasons for its decision.

As to the appellant’s allegations concerning the authenticity of the signature and the apparent use of an agent by the landlord, the court observed that the appellant had not raised any issue in this respect at hearing before the Tribunal, highlighting: “The finding material to this appeal — that the apparent failure to sign the Termination Notice did not invalidate it — does not have anything to do with the question of agency.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court refused the reliefs sought.

Chimwala v The Residential Tenancies Board [2026] IEHC 71