About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 77
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice David Nolan

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice David Nolan reasoned: “The processing was necessary for the work of a solicitor working in the conveyance. The balancing test flows from the necessity. There is no harm to the Plaintiff from these steps.”

Background

The plaintiff and his wife purchased a property at 15 Bruce Manor, Co Cavan in the 2000s, with a loan provided by Permanent TSB (PTSB).

The plaintiff alleged that PTSB failed to obtain his consent to enable the lawful transfer of his loan account to Start Mortgages DAC (Start) and that the transfer breached the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), with the result that all related transactions thereafter were tainted by illegality.

Start appointed receivers with power of sale over the property and on 31 May 2024, transferred the mortgage to Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC (Mars) and by deed of novation re-appointed the same receivers.

The property was auctioned on Bid X1 and third parties, for whom the defendant solicitors act, were successful in their bid. The solicitors carried out the normal enquiries and assisted in inter alia concluding the contract for sale, transferring the purchase monies and ensuring stamp duty was paid.

The plaintiff had also instituted another set of proceedings against all involved with the sale of the property, which he failed to progress.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being bound to fail. The plaintiff also brought a motion seeking reliefs including inspection of the defendant solicitors’ files.

The High Court

Mr Justice Nolan observed that the plaintiff’s pleadings while reading relatively cogently, said “little or nothing of relevance” and failed to set out how the known facts related to the alleged breaches.

The judge recalled permitting the plaintiff the assistance of a McKenzie friend, and in noting that it was patently clear that the plaintiff did not draft his pleadings, emphasised: “It is not the role of a McKenzie friend to draft documents, legal submissions or purport to act as a legal adviser, since that is prohibited, by criminal sanction, pursuant to both the Solicitors Act 1954 (as amended) and the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (as amended).”

In this regard, Mr Justice Nolan warned: “I would be concerned that litigants such as the Plaintiff may be asked to pay for such advice. That too is a criminal offence. Persons who seek this advice should act very carefully.”

Turning to the applicable legislation, the court considered that article 79 GDPR allows a data subject to take legal action where there is evidence that their data rights have been infringed, but that such an action must be based upon evidence, not an impression or supposition.

Considering articles 5 and 6 GDPR, the court noted that the former mandates that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner, and that the latter outlines what is lawful processing of data.

In this regard, Mr Justice Nolan set out circumstances in which processing is lawful, including where processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party, for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject or to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person, and for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where same are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data.

Noting the three-step test for the lawful use of data outlined in Case C-252/21, Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt, the court then considered the principles applicable to applications to dismiss proceedings under Order 19, Rule 28(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

Observing that if there is no meaningful dispute as to the relevant facts, it is open to the court to dismiss the claim if it simply cannot succeed as a matter of law, Mr Justice Nolan confirmed that in the case before the court there was no dispute as to the relevant facts.

The judge also considered that the duties of solicitors in acting for a client in a conveyance are not only contractual but are statutory duties arising from inter alia s.58 of the Solicitors Act 1954, s.50 of the Legal Regulation Services Act 2015.

Mr Justice Nolan continued: “As if that were not enough authority, it would be professional negligence for a solicitor not to continue their retainer and in certain circumstances go beyond, in the interests of their client. There is no doubt whatsoever that the role of a solicitor requires the use of a lot of information.”

Mr Justice Nolan took the view that the use of the plaintiff’s name, address and description of the property was and is not unlawful because it fell squarely within the parameters of article 6(1)(b), (c), (e) and (f).

The judge explained: “While he (or his McKenzie friend) argues that the case is all about alleged breaches of data, it is clear that is not the case. It is in fact about an alternative purpose, namely, to prevent the conclusion of the sale of the property.”

In those circumstances, the court stated that it would not allow the proceedings to continue where they represented an abuse of process.

The court referenced the fact that the plaintiff had put his other proceedings on hold pending the progression of the proceedings the subject of its judgment, noting: “If he were able to achieve his real purpose through this case, he would have no need to progress those proceedings, which challenge the powers of sale of the mortgage and the property.”

Mr Justice Nolan found that in circumstances where any processing of the plaintiff’s data occurred in order to complete the sale and was incidental and necessary for complying with the obligations of the solicitors’ contract of retainer, the sale and their contractual and statutory obligations, the processing was not illegal.

Highlighting that the plaintiff’s arguments were based on an unproven allegation that the transfer of his loan to PTSB was somehow illegal, the court stated that it must accept the transfer on its face as to do otherwise would allow any litigant to prevent any inconvenience, in any circumstances that were not to their liking.

The court concluded that the plaintiff’s proceedings constituted a collateral attack by the plaintiff on the sale of the property to the purchasers, that there would be no real risk of injustice by striking out the proceedings and that they could not be saved by amendment.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the proceedings.

Gerry Burns v John J. Quinn & Co. LLP & Ors [2026] IEHC 77