About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IEHC 605
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Garrett Simons

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice Garrett Simons determined that the “signal failure on the part of the Labour Court to explain the rationale for its decisions, and as to why it had rejected the applicants’ arguments on statutory interpretation, has the practical effect of undermining the effectiveness of the statutory right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law”.

Background

The applicant film production workers both submitted complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) pursuant to the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 and the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003.

The disputes arose against the backdrop of controversy relating to employment practices in the film industry, particularly the use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to obtain the “film corporation tax credit” provided for under s.481 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (as amended), the receipt of which depends on the establishment by a producer company of a SPV (a “qualifying company”) for the purposes of producing one “qualifying film”, and the use of which could affect the reckoning of the minimum period of continuous employment or service necessary to acquire certain employment rights.

Jason Arkins contended that he had been employed as a stagehand pursuant to continuous and successive fixed-term contracts issued by various qualifying companies, which had all been incorporated by the same producer company, Metropolitan Films International Ltd.

Paul Arkins’ position was that, for some of the time, he had been treated as a freelance worker and taxed as a self-employed person. The WRC found that he had been in continuous employment as an employee for approximately 18 years, notwithstanding that he had been laid off from time to time between films.

Each applicant argued that the terms “employer” and “employee” should be interpreted such that his employment relationship was with Metropolitan Films International Ltd rather than the individual qualifying companies, drawing attention to inter alia the existence of a definition of “film group” under the Film Regulations 2019 (SI No. 119 of 2019), defined as the producer company, the qualifying company and all businesses regarded as partner or linked businesses of either company.

In each case, the applicants were successful and the matters were appealed to the Labour Court, with the principal on appeal being whether a production worker, who has worked for a series of qualifying companies under the auspices of the same producer company, could be said to have an employment relationship with the producer company.

The Labour Court held that there was no evidence of the existence of a contract of employment between either of the two applicants and the producer company. In Jason Arkins’ case, the Labour Court’s decision quoted incorrect legislation and in Paul Arkins’ case, the Labour Court did not explain whether or why it disagreed with the WRC that he had continuous employment for 18 years.

The applicants obtained leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Labour Court’s decision, prompting the producer company to file motions seeking to set aside the grant of leave in each case. The Labour Court did not participate in the motions.

The High Court

Mr Justice Simons noted that it is well-established that the High Court has an inherent power to set aside any order obtained on an ex parte basis, as recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in M.D. v. Board of Management of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11.

The judge highlighted that the jurisdiction to set aside is to be exercised sparingly and that the pursuit of an application to set aside leave would, “if commonly adopted, result in systemic delay. It would eventuate in there being, in effect, three hearings in relation to any judicial review proceedings”.

The court turned to the first ground relied upon by the producer company, that there was an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review available to the applicants in the form of an express statutory right of appeal against a decision of the Labour Court to the High Court on a point of law pursuant to s.46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

Mr Justice Simons agreed that the default position is that a party should pursue a statutory appeal rather than judicial review, but observed that there will be exceptions where the justice of the case will not be met by confining a person to the statutory appeal.

The judge determined that the proceedings before him fell within that category of case where the reasons provided by the Labour Court for its decisions were inadequate and where it had failed to engage with the applicants’ argument, accepted by the WRC, that the concepts of “employee” and “employer” had to be given an interpretation which was consistent with the overall statutory context and, in particular, the statutory requirement that the provision of tax credits stimulate “quality employment” in the film industry.

Finding that the Labour Court had “baldly stated” that each applicant had been employed by a qualifying company, Mr Justice Simons remarked: “With respect, this should have been the start of the legal analysis, not the terminus.”

The judge considered that the “signal failure” on part of the Labour Court to explain the rationale for its decisions had the practical effect of undermining the effectiveness of the statutory right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law, as a condition precedent to the High Court’s jurisdiction is that the reasons and rationale for the decision under appeal be disclosed.

The court explained “were it otherwise, substantive errors of law would go uncorrected. The Labour Court, by delivering an inscrutable decision, would be able to shield its decision from appeal.”

Mr Justice Simons then addressed the second ground relied upon, that the judicial review proceedings failed to meet the low threshold of an arguable case. The producer company argued, by reference to Arkins v. Labour Court [2025] IEHC 416 (Arkins No.1), that the issue of whether the applicants had been employed by it was a factual matter which the Labour Court was better placed to decide than a court of judicial review.

The producer company further argued that the High Court, exercising its supervisory judicial review jurisdiction, could only set aside a primary finding of fact if it is unreasonable or irrational.

Mr Justice Simons did not accept that the issue of the applicants’ employment was a factual one, and pointed out that whereas the Labour Court is generally afforded a significant margin of appreciation relating to findings of fact, that is contingent on the Labour Court having explained the basis for its findings of fact.

The judge distinguished Arkins No.1, noting that the basis that the Labour Court’s decisions in that case arose from a factual dispute and that the issues in the present cases had not been advanced to the same extent or at all.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court refused the applications.

Arkins & Anor v Labour Court [2025] IEHC 605