Supreme Court: Claims for emotional distress without recognised psychiatric injury do not require PIAB authorisation

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IESC 37
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Supreme Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Brian Murray

Delivering judgment for the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Brian Murray remarked that plaintiffs pursuing claims solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety “cannot expect anything other than very, very modest awards.”

Background

The plaintiff held a life assurance policy with the defendant. Between 2008 and 2020, letters relating to the plaintiff’s policy and containing his financial and personal data were sent in error by the defendant to a third party.

In 2021, the plaintiff issued Circuit Court proceedings claiming that the data breaches arose due to negligence and breach of duty (including statutory duty) on part of the defendant, causing him distress, upset, anxiety, inconvenience, loss and damage.

The plaintiff did not obtain an authorisation from the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) before issuing his issuing proceedings.

The Circuit Court dismissed the proceedings as being frivolous, vexatious and bound to fail, a decision upheld on appeal to the High Court, finding that the proceedings sought damages for ‘personal injury’ and so the plaintiff ought to have obtained an authorisation from PIAB prior to issuing proceedings as is required by s.12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003.

Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted on the questions of whether non-material damage in the form of distress, upset and anxiety falls within the statutory definition of ‘personal injury’, and if so, whether a requirement to apply to PIAB would render it excessively difficult for the plaintiff to exercise his right to compensation for non-material damage under the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the GDPR), in breach of Ireland’s obligation to give full effect to EU law.

The Supreme Court

Mr Justice Murray considered the various statutory definitions of ‘personal injury’, noting that the term’s prevalence is such that it is “easy to lose sight of the fact that while the definition of ‘personal injury’ used in these statutes is comprehensive, in none of them does it purport to be of general application”.

The judge highlighted that none of the statutes purport to replace the “common law definition of personal injury”, noting “by this I mean the test applied by the courts to determine if there is damage to the person that will complete the tort of negligence, or that will be of such substance as to enable a court to award damages where sought on a standalone basis in claims based on torts other than negligence”.

In this regard, Mr Justice Murray considered that s.2(1) of the Civil Liability Act 1961 reflected, but did not supplant, the common law definition.

The Court observed that a person’s interests as recognised in common law were protected by the law of negligence in cases of physical damage and recognised psychiatric injury, emphasising that it has never been possible claim damages in tort solely for mental distress, upset, fear, anxiety or inconvenience unless consequent upon proven and recognised damage, or in the case of contractual claims, where the protection of the plaintiff against such losses was envisaged as part of the bargain.

Mr Justice Murray turned to the statutory language, noting that while the provision is ambiguous, it could be argued that the reference to “impairment” therein implies a disability or reduction of function not injuriously resulting in a reduction in functional capacity or of the ability of the person to carry on their daily activities, and “thus stand to be contrasted with an ‘injury’ as that term is ordinarily understood”.

Viewing the words in context, the Court considered that the 2003 Act was introduced enable the resolution of claims for compensation for a defined injury to a person, and that such cases do not encompass claims where the only relief sought is damages for stress and anxiety.

The Court noted inter alia that s.4 of the 2003 Act extends the definition of a ‘civil action’ to fatal accident claims which allow compensation for mental distress consequent upon death and that if mental distress was itself a personal injury, that extension would not have been necessary.

Turning to the proceedings before the Court, Mr Justice Murray considered that the plaintiff’s claim in negligence was misconceived, where the damage which is a constituent element of the tort was not alleged, and that his claim for breach of duty was at best otiose, noting that same was a claim for non-material damage pursuant to the sui generis claim enabled by s. 117 of the 2018 Act and that “it would be clearer in future if claims made only pursuant to s. 117 are pleaded as such.”

The judge observed that there may well be cases in which plaintiffs allege that an infringement of their rights under the 2018 Act have given rise to medically-recognised psychiatric injury, and that “it is important to stress that claims based upon such a medically recognised psychiatric injury will be actions for damages for personal injuries within the meaning of the 2003 Act and will accordingly have to go through the PIAB authorisation process.”

The Court concluded that a free-standing claim in tort or contract seeking to recover damages for emotional disturbances such as mental distress, worry, fear, upset, inconvenience and anxiety falling short of a recognised psychiatric disorder is not a ‘personal injury’ claim within the meaning of the 2003 Act, and so a PIAB authorisation is not a precondition to proceedings.

Mr Justice Murray confirmed that any other construction would assume that the Oireachtas intended the phrase ‘personal injury’ to deviate from its normal usage by the legal profession, imposing a requirement for PIAB authorisation in respect of claims for damages for negligence that could not in law be sustained, and imposing on PIAB the burden of assessing categories of tort or contract actions that were in no sense within the contemplation of that legislation.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the other questions canvassed did not arise and allowed the appeal.

Dillon v Irish Life Assurance PLC [2025] IESC 37