High Court: Principal convicted of theft of €100,000 from school retained on register subject to conditions

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 244
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice David Barniville

Delivering an ex tempore judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice David Barniville opined that the respondent’s gambling addiction was “a very significant factor in this case and it is one that persuades me that the sanction, which on the face of it appears very lenient, is in fact a sanction which the Panel was entitled reasonably to impose”.

Background

On 17 February 2022, the respondent was convicted of several offences under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 arising from the theft of sums of just over €100,000 from the school in which he, at the time, was the principal.

On 2 June 2022, the respondent was sentenced to a period of six years’ imprisonment, with four-and-a-half years suspended.

A complaint was referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the Teaching Council on grounds that the respondent was medically unfit to teach on the basis of a gambling addiction and/or a gambling disorder and that he had been convicted of an offence triable on indictment.

The matter proceeded before the applicant on the basis of the respondent’s conviction.

The Teaching Council

The applicant had regard to the seriousness of the offences, which involved 381 instances of theft from the school; the significant term of imprisonment imposed notwithstanding mitigating factors; the fact that the offences involved a significant breach of trust on part of a person in a position of authority; and to the fact that the school, which provides special needs education, had been deprived of significant resources as a consequence of the respondent’s actions.

As to aggravating factors, the applicant considered that the respondent had stolen from the school credit card, had forged the signature of the Chairperson of the school’s Board of Management on cheques and had deprived the school of resources and planned infrastructure.

By way of mitigation, the applicant accepted uncontroverted evidence that the thefts were carried out to feed the respondent’s gambling addiction, and that the theft was an integral part of the disease.

The applicant further had regard to inter alia the respondent’s cooperation with the investigation and inquiry process, his genuine remorse for and insight into his conduct, and the fact that he had repaid the majority of the monies stolen.

The applicant found that the convictions affected the respondent’s fitness to teach pursuant to s.43(17)(b)(v) of the Teaching Council Act 2001 (as amended), and at a subsequent hearing, determined that the appropriate sanction was the censure of the respondent and his suspension for a period of a calendar month.

The applicant determined that the respondent should be retained on the register on condition that the respondent would not take up any teaching post that would involve access to money or finance, that the respondent would inform any employer or prospective employer of the conditions, that the respondent would, at his own expense, attend a consultant psychiatrist to obtain a report evidencing his adherence to medical advice for his recovery for a period of 12 months, and to provide the report to the applicant within 15 months.

The applicant also stipulated that it be at liberty to communicate the terms of its order to a number of statutory bodies in the United Kingdom.

The applicant applied to the High Court for the confirmation of its decision.

The High Court

Mr Justice Barniville, President of the High Court, noted that the only matter of contention was whether or not the court should direct that the suspension be deferred until 1 July 2026, on the basis that this would least inconvenience the school where he now teaches.

The applicant opposed the deferral of the suspension, submitting that such an order would only be appropriate where are good and compelling reasons provided, such as where there is particular prejudice to either a respondent in terms of having to put their affairs in order before a suspension can take effect, or where there is insuperable prejudice caused to a third party.

The respondent set out that he had experienced difficulties in obtaining employment following his release from prison and that since December 2024, he had been working at a special school for children with complex needs and was anxious that his suspension would entail the least disruption and inconvenience possible to the school and its pupils.

Mr Justice Barniville considered that pursuant to s.44(5) of the 2001 Act, the court was required to confirm the decision unless there was “good reason” to the contrary.

As to the meaning of the phrase “good reason”, the President explained that if the court were to refuse confirmation, “it would have to be satisfied that the decision was one which no reasonable professional disciplinary or regulatory body could make in the circumstances or that there was some breach of the rules of natural and constitutional justice in the process, or that some serious and significant error of law or of fact had been made by the panel in reaching its decision”.

Clarifying that there was “no question” of any of those matters in the case before it, the court highlighted: “It seems to be that it was within the Panel’s discretion to impose the sanction which it did and to determine that the period of one calendar month was the appropriate time period for the suspension, irrespective of the sanction seeming somewhat lenient at first glance.”

However, the court was satisfied that it had jurisdiction to direct that the respondent’s suspension could commence at a future date, envisaged by the wording of the sanction which prescribed that the suspension would run “for a period of one calendar month from the date that such suspension becomes effective”.

Mr Justice Barniville indicated that he was persuaded by the respondent’s desire not to unduly discommode the school at which he was now teaching and found that this was a good reason to defer suspension until 1 July 2026.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court confirmed the applicant’s decision.

The Teaching Council v CD [2026] IEHC 244