High Court: Plaintiff’s second actions should not be dismissed as she did not receive a determination of issues in first action

The High Court has allowed an appeal against an order striking out a plaintiff’s proceedings on the basis that the proceedings did not offend the rule in Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100. The plaintiff had issued a previous set of proceedings arising from the same incident and the Circuit Court struck out the second set of proceedings.

Delivering judgment in the case, Mr Justice Anthony Barr held that the plaintiff did not receive a judicial determination of all the issues which were raised in the prior proceedings and therefore she was entitled to raise those issues again. Further, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim did not require a PIAB authorisation despite claims of bullying and harassment leading to PTSD.

Background

The plaintiff was previously employed by the third defendant, City Learning Limited. The first defendant was the managing director and the second defendant was also a director. In April 2013, the plaintiff began her employment as a telesales executive and claimed that she was later promoted to sales executive.

The plaintiff claimed that the managing director acted erratically and unacceptably to other members of staff. The plaintiff claimed to have been subjected to outbursts and public criticism. She eventually left the job seeking new employment.

When the plaintiff sought a reference from the first defendant, the reference referred to the plaintiff as a telesales executive. The plaintiff maintained that she had been working under the title of sales executive. Despite requests to amend the reference, the defendants maintained that the plaintiff’s role was correctly described. 

Subsequently, the plaintiff issued proceedings in the Circuit Court against the company, alleging that she had been severely impeded by the incorrect job reference in obtaining alternative employment as a sales executive. She also alleged that she had been bullied and harassed by the first defendant. Finally, it was claimed that that she had been defamed by the contents of the reference and the publication of certain emails to a government agency which described her as a telesales executive.

In November 2018, the matter was heard. It was common case that the Circuit Court judge rejected the defamation claims and made no finding on whether the reference was a good work reference, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the reference, what her job description was, where she was an employee or on the issue of bullying and harassment.

In March 2019, the plaintiff issued another set of proceedings which related to the same issues in the earlier proceedings. She claimed to suffer loss of earnings from the inaccurate reference and that she had suffered PTSD and anxiety as a result of the defendants’ actions.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the proceedings on two grounds. First, it was said that the second proceedings offended the rule in Henderson v. Henderson in relation to the company. Second, it was said that the plaintiff had failed to obtain a PIAB authorisation for claims relating to PTSD. The application was successful in the Circuit Court and the matter was appealed.

High Court

Mr Justice Barr began by considering the rule in Henderson v. Henderson. It was well-established that a party could not seek to litigate issues which should have been raised in earlier proceedings. The court noted the decision in AA v. The Medical Council [2003] 4 IR 302, where it was held that it was overly dogmatic to say that just because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings that it should have been raised.

The court also noted that there were potential exceptions to the application of Henderson v. Henderson, such as where special circumstances applied (see Arklow Holidays Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2012] 2 IR 99; SM v. Ireland [2007] 3 IR 283; Cunningham v. Intel Ireland Ltd [2013] IEHC 207).

In this case, it was accepted that the trial judge in the earlier proceedings did not deal with any aspect of the plaintiff’s claim other than whether she was defamed. The court was therefore satisfied that the subsequent proceedings were not frivolous or an abuse of process.

The court held that the plaintiff enjoyed a constitutional right of access to the courts and was entitled to bring proceedings and receive a judicial determination. In the earlier proceedings, she did not receive a determination on all the issues “for whatever reason.” 

As such, the plaintiff was only prohibited from raising arguments that she was defamed by the company. In so ruling, the court noted that while the Circuit Court had held that the reference was not defamatory, this did not mean that it was accurate. The plaintiff’s present case was for damages arising from loss of earnings due to the mischaracterisation of her role in the reference.

The court then considered whether the matter should be struck out for failing to obtain a PIAB authorisation. The court was satisfied that the claim fell within the exception contained in section 4(1)(b)(i) of the PIAB Act 2003, which stated that the Act did not apply to a personal injuries action which included a claim for damages or other relief “in respect of any other cause of action.”

The court held that the plaintiff was claiming that she was wrongfully dismissed. Her loss of earnings claim flowed from her dismissal and mischaracterised employment role rather than from the claim of PTSD, the court said. In this regard, the court noted that the contents of the reference and the refusal to amend it were not disputed by the defendants.

On this basis, the court was satisfied that the present proceedings were not a civil action which required a PIAB authorisation prior to institution. 

Conclusion

The court allowed the appeal and refused the application to strike out the proceedings.

Munnelly v. Hassett and Ors. [2022] IEHC 632

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