High Court criticises attempt to prevent property sale by intimidating auctioneer

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 299
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Michael Twomey

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice Michael Twomey considered that a letter sent to Savills on the plaintiff’s instruction amounted to a weaponisation of High Court costs in order to achieve its objectives and that while this conduct was not determinative in the court’s decision, “it certainly was not helpful to Goldstein’s case.”

Background

Between 2019 and 2022, the first defendant provided loans to the plaintiff and its predecessors totalling approximately €143 million.

The loans expired on 30 September 2024 and were not repaid, leading the first defendant to appoint receivers over 47 commercial properties provided by way of security for the loans, including a commercial building in Ballsbridge, Dublin 4 known as Shelbourne House, on 13 November 2024.

In August 2025, the plaintiff issued proceedings challenging the entitlement of the first defendant to call in the loans and alleging that it was estopped from appointing the receivers where an agreement had allegedly been reached with the first defendant to extend the final repayment date for the loans.

On 21 January 2026, the High Court refused to strike out the proceedings, albeit acknowledging that the plaintiff’s claim was a very weak one.

In this regard, the court observed, “if RELM really had agreed an extension of the Final Repayment Date, why was this not the first thing that Goldstein said, when the Receivers were appointed?”

As part of the estoppel proceedings, the plaintiff registered a lis pendens against the properties. The court vacated the lis pendens, concluding that a borrower which was allegedly in default on repayments should not be entitled to effectively prevent a receiver from selling secured properties without any court intervention or oversight.

In or about 19 February 2026, the plaintiff, in an attempt to prevent the sale of Shelbourne House, instructed the law firm William Fry to write a letter to the auctioneers, Savills, acting for the receivers.

The letter warned that Savills could be sued by the plaintiff if it did not cease to act for the receivers in relation to the sale of Shelbourne House in light of the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of their appointment.

The plaintiff issued further proceedings on 27 February 2026 disputing the sum required to be paid to redeem the mortgages over the commercial properties.

On 18 March 2026, the plaintiff issued a motion seeking an interlocutory injunction preventing the receivers from selling all of the commercial properties, requiring the first defendant to provide information to allow the plaintiff to interrogate the redemption sum for the mortgages, and requiring the first defendant to facilitate the drawdown of a new loan from the plaintiff’s incoming funder, Earlsfort Capital.

The High Court

Noting that there was no dispute as to the relevant legal principles, Mr Justice Twomey considered that on the assumption that the plaintiff had established a fair issue to be tried regarding the redemption sum, the key issue was whether the balance of justice favoured the grant or refusal of the application.

The judge explained that the only real dispute between the parties in both sets of proceedings was whether the receivers were validly appointed, the resolution of which would likely significantly resolve the issue of the correct redemption sum.

The court highlighted that it was entitled to take account of the strength of the underlying case and that in circumstances where the High Court had already identified the “inextricably linked” claim in the estoppel proceedings as being “very weak”, “the Redemption Proceedings are similarly weak.”

Mr Justice Twomey further recognised a total delay of 16 months and 4 days on part of the plaintiff in seeking an injunction, identifying the date of the appointment of the receivers as being the relevant date for the calculation of the delay.

The judge remarked that there was nothing to stop the plaintiff seeking to redeem the mortgages immediately after its alleged default and that if it had done so without delay, there would have been much less, if any, of the fees, costs and interests incurred which comprised the difference between the parties in the redemption sums.

The court was not convinced that the properties were likely to be sold at an undervalue as alleged by the plaintiff, noting the absence of cogent evidence in that regard and that the plaintiff itself could buy the properties where it could clearly obtain sufficient funding for that purpose.

As to the adequacy of damages, the court was satisfied that the balance of justice did not swing decisively in favour of or against the granting of an injunction where both parties could claim that in certain circumstances, damages might not be an adequate remedy.

Turning to the conduct of the plaintiff, Mr Justice Twomey considered that the letter sent by William Fry to Savills on the instruction of the plaintiff constituted a threat of litigation as against an innocent third party, “with the authority and imprimatur of a large and established law firm with expertise in expensive High Court litigation”, and from a company with access to resources to carry out the threat.

The court also pointed out that the letter, which failed to mention that the challenge to the receivers’ appointment had been recognised as being “very weak” only a few weeks prior, was clearly intended to interfere in Savills’ everyday commercial relations by ensuring that it would stop acting for one of its clients, and constituted “one of three attempts” made by the plaintiff to prevent the sale of the property without a court order to that effect.

Mr Justice Twomey further observed that the letter weaponised the fact that High Court costs are prohibitive, finding that the mere receipt of the letter per se could lead to Savills incurring legal costs where it would be forced to obtain legal advice thereon, and where many recipients of such a letter would simply do what is required to avoid “even a slight risk” of incurring significant legal costs.

In that regard, the judge remarked that “this type of high-grade weaponisation of costs would appear to be much easier in Ireland than in other jurisdictions. This is because of the concentration of civil litigation in Ireland in the High Court (rather than in the much less expensive District or Circuit Courts), which concentration is out of step with international norms.”

Finding that while there was nothing unlawful or determinative in the plaintiff’s weaponisation of legal costs, which fell short of the type of ‘lawfare’ criticised by the Irish courts in M v M [2026] IESC 2 and in Morgan v Labour Court [2025] IECA 2, “the letter did not assist Goldstein when this Court came to deciding where the balance of justice lies”.

Conclusion

Having briefly addressed the balance of the reliefs sought, the High Court refused to grant an injunction.

Goldstein Property ICAV v RELM Loan Opportunities 2 DAC & Ors [2026] IEHC 299