High Court: Distribution of estate in accordance with settlement terms refused

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 645
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Siobhán Stack

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Siobhán Stack confirmed that “the jurisdiction identified in Re Hannon only extends to cases where all those who might stand to benefit from the outcome of proceedings which are being compromised are agreeable to the making of the order pursuant to section 27(4).”

Background

On 7 November 2015, Christopher Kearns died a bachelor and without issue. The deceased left a will dated September 2006, in which he named gifted his entire estate in two equal shares between the first defendant and his niece.

The will named the defendants as executors. The plaintiff, a brother of the deceased, challenged the will on the basis that he was not named in the will as the deceased suffered from irrational delusions about him due to schizophrenia which caused psychotic symptoms.

In March 2017, the plaintiff issued proceedings alleging that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity to choose among those who would have been likely to benefit. 

The plaintiff died three years later and the parties reached an agreement that the original plaintiff’s estate would receive a one third share in the deceased’s estate.

The matter came before the High Court for the purposes of an application to substitute the original plaintiff’s son in the proceedings as plaintiff, and for an application pursuant to s.27(4) of the Succession Act 1965 seeking an order permitting the defendants to administer the deceased’s estate in accordance with the terms of settlement.  .

The High Court

Having acceded to the substitution application, Ms Justice Stack considered that an order pursuant to s.27(4) of the 1965 Act was inappropriate in the circumstances.

The judge explained that the latter application had been made in reliance on Re Hannon [2018] 3 IR 402, in which the High Court noted its discretion pursuant to s.27(4) and balanced the public interest in giving effect to the wishes of a deceased on the one hand, and the public interest in “quietening litigation around the succession to the estate of a deceased person and in the consensual resolution of interfamily disputes”.

Observing that the issue with the application before her was that not all those affected by the proceedings had been joined, nor were they parties to the settlement, nor were they on notice of the application, Ms Justice Stack opined that the issue of a grant “would not finally “quieten” any issues relating to the validity of the Deceased’s Will.”

The court noted that the deceased was one of a family of eleven and was survived by one sibling and at least 21 nieces and nephews who were entitled on intestacy.

Ms Justice Stack outlined that in Re Hannon, which concerned a challenge to the validity of a second will by the beneficiaries of an earlier version, Ms Justice Marie Baker specifically noted that both those entitled under the impugned will and the earlier will were parties to the compromise and that all those who would be entitled on intestacy were on notice of the application did not object to the order.

Turning to the case before her, the judge considered that the a grant was being sought to give effect to a settlement reached between the beneficiaries under the will and the original plaintiff, who was only one of the persons entitled on intestacy and who would have been entitled on intestacy to only a one-sixth share in the deceased’s estate.

The court took the view that the application was one of convenience, where it would allow the defendants to apply for a grant “notwithstanding an unresolved question as to capacity which might result in five-sixths of the estate passing to the nieces and nephews entitled pursuant to s 69 of the 1965 Act.”

In the circumstances, the court was satisfied that the jurisdiction identified in Re Hannon “only extends to cases where all those who might stand to benefit from the outcome of proceedings which are being compromised are agreeable to the making of the order pursuant to section 27(4)”.

Remarking upon the first defendant’s grounding affidavit, the court expressed dissatisfaction with incorrect information therein to the effect that there were no other surviving relations of the deceased save for his brother and niece.

Ms Justice Stack warned, “particular care should be taken to ensure that full information is given to the Court as to the family members who stand to benefit on intestacy, where that is relevant. This will usually require that a family member should swear the affidavit. Furthermore, if – as in this case – the deponent is not a family member, their means of knowledge should be stated.”

Highlighting that “it is not enough to say who “survived” the deceased as this term is used colloquially to identify the deceased’s closest relations and this is often not one and the same as the persons entitled on intestacy”, the judge deemed it necessary for applicant family members to state positively the total number of children or siblings of the deceased, whether or not they survived the deceased, and whether any pre-deceased child had issue or any pre-deceased sibling had children. 

Ms Justice Stack added that insofar as the terms “next of kin” or “heir at law” were referred to in pleading that the original plaintiff was entitled to succeed on intestacy to the deceased’s entire estate, that was incorrect as “heir in law” was a concept no longer relevant to modern estates and “next of kin”, although colloquially referring to a deceased’s closest surviving relatives, “is used in s.70 of the 1965 Act to refer to the potential intestate successors of a deceased who is not survived by a spouse (or civil partner), issue, parent, sibling, or any child of a pre-deceased sibling.”

Conclusion

In the circumstances, the High Court refused to accede to the application for a grant pursuant to s.27(4) of the 1965 Act.

Kearns v Daly & Anor [2026] IEHC 645