About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] IEHC 514
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Mr Justice Max Barrett

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Mr Justice Max Barrett considered that it was not in dispute that X was entitled under its terms of service to impose the suspension on the plaintiff’s account, and further, that the proposed proactive monitoring obligations sought to be imposed upon X could potentially cause harm to X and to innocent users whose accounts could be flagged by automated systems designed to detect account impersonation.

Background

The plaintiff opened an account on the platform X (then Twitter) in or about 2012. He built a presence on the platform by providing advice on cryptocurrency investment, and further operated related TikTok and YouTube accounts and was a co-founder of a website offering investment training.

In March 2022, the plaintiff impersonated a “blue tick” verified account on X. In this regard, he alleged that his purpose in doing so was to test the strength of X’s protections against impersonation of verified accounts.

The plaintiff’s actions had breached X’s then applicable terms of service. Subsequently, on 17 July 2025, X suspended the plaintiff’s account. He queried the suspension with X, which stated that he had engaged in ban evasion and breached monetisation standards on the platform.

The plaintiff subsequently sought inter alia interim relief restraining X from suspending his account, requiring X to suspend, block, or otherwise prevent from appearing any accounts impersonating or purporting to pass themselves off as his account, or which use an account name confusingly similar to his, in circumstances where his accounts had been impersonated several hundred times.

Interim relief was granted ex parte on 11 September 2025, and was stayed on the following day when counsel for both sides appeared. On 16 September 2025, the plaintiff issued a motion on notice seeking the same interlocutory reliefs and ancillary orders.

Submissions

The plaintiff contended inter alia that the suspension of his account impinged on his right to earn a livelihood and to freedom of expression.

X highlighted that the reliefs sought would require proactive measures on its part to monitor all accounts on the EU platform, and that given the breadth of the proposed orders, the significant rate at which new accounts were opened, and the potential thousands of permutations of the account name which could subjectively be considered “confusingly similar”, it would not be able to confirm that it had fully complied with the orders and could not use automated tools for flagging impersonation accounts.

X further submitted that it already provides ID-verified tools for users to complain about account impersonation, the use of which would avoid the burden of having humans constantly reviewing accounts flagged by automated systems, some accounts of which could be legitimate accounts, and the risk of reputational damage and legal proceedings arising from the suspension of legitimate user accounts.

The High Court

Noting that “though framed as negative”, the interlocutory reliefs sought by the plaintiff would require X to take positive steps including the reinstatement of his account, Mr Justice Barrett was satisfied that same amounted to mandatory injunctive relief and so the modified test enunciated in Maha Lingham v. HSE [2005] IESC 89 applied and he was required to demonstrate a strong case likely to succeed at trial.

The court considered the proportionality of the suspension in light of the plaintiff’s claimed rights, finding that the suspension did not constitute a disproportionate interference with any such rights where he had engaged in impersonation himself and retained other significant channels to communicate on matters of public concern.

As to whether damages would be an adequate remedy, the judge explained that the plaintiff monetised his X presence by receiving direct payments from X based on engagement with his verified account, through commercial partnerships, through sponsored referrals to cryptocurrency-related websites, and by directing X users to his educational website.

Being satisfied that the plaintiff operated other monetised platforms and had diversified revenue streams, notwithstanding that his X account might by his primary online portal, the court determined that the plaintiff had not established a strong case that damages would be inadequate.

Mr Justice Barrett also observed that even if the lower “serious issue to be tried” test for securing interlocutory relief were to apply, the plaintiff “would still fall short” where he failed to identify any contractual term, statutory obligation or settled duty requiring reinstatement of his account or proactive monitoring of impersonators.

Noting that the sole evidence of harm to the plaintiff was affidavit evidence to the effect that the suspension would damage the plaintiff’s livelihood and reputation, the judge concluded that it was not clear that any such harm would be irreparable and that the desired injunction would cause harm to both X and an unknown number of X users who may be innocent of wrongdoing in the operation of their accounts, “unlike [the plaintiff] who has a self-acknowledged past history of impersonation”.

Mr Justice Barrett also considered the uncontroverted averments on behalf of X to the effect that the imposition of a general or pro-active monitoring obligation would breach Article 8 of the Digital Services Act (DSA), but declined to decide that issue or the related question as to how the reliefs could be crafted to avoid falling foul of the prohibitions in Article 8, in circumstances where the court was prepared to deny the reliefs on other bases.

The court, however, emphasised: “It is not the role of the court to re-design the relief sought into a form that might avoid a legal bar or issue presenting.”

As to X’s allegations of delay on part of the plaintiff in bringing the dispute to court, Mr Justice Barrett reasoned: “Even if I accept that the suspension of the account had an immediate effect on [the plaintiff’s] business, I believe that a court can take judicial notice of the fact that an immediate (and logical) response of a relatively small sole trader in such circumstances may not be to hurry to commence potentially expensive court proceedings, if an alternative approach may bring about the same end at less expense.”

Finally, the court considered the preservation of the status quo ante, explaining that that principle “presupposes a lawful baseline” and that the “‘status quo’ that equity protects is not one that is tainted by breach. To restore [the plaintiff’s] account now would be to reinstate a state of affairs to which he had no continuing entitlement under terms and conditions which, on his own account, he has both accepted and breached.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, the High Court declined the orders sought and vacated the stayed interim order.

Farina v X Internet Unlimited Company [2025] IEHC 514