High Court: Court determines preliminary issues in LinkedIn appeal of 2024 DPC decision

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] IEHC 235
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  High Court
• Judge:
  Ms Justice Nessa Cahill

Delivering judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Nessa Cahill determined that appeals under s.142 of the Data Protection Act 2018 are limited to appeals against the decision to impose a fine and not in respect of decisions on infringement, that s.142 appeals are appeals on the record with the possibility of the admission of new evidence or argument, and that it is within the discretion of the court to determine whether to admit new evidence or argument in an appeal under s.150(5) of the 2018 Act.

Background

In 2018, La Quadrature du Net, a French non-profit organisation, complained on behalf of 8,540 LinkedIn users to the French supervisory authority for General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compliance, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberts (CNIL).

The complaint focused on LinkedIn’s processing of the personal data of its members in the EEA and the UK for the purpose of behavioural analysis and targeted advertising, alleging that such processing was not in compliance with the requirements of the GDPR.

The complaint was referred by CNIL to the Data Protection Commission (DPC). Over a period of six years, the DPC investigated the complaint, resulting in a decision dated 22 October 2024 which found that LinkedIn had infringed Articles 5(1)a, 6(1), 13(1)(c) and 14(1)(c) of the GDPR.

The DPC decided to exercise its corrective powers in the form of a reprimand, an order bringing LinkedIn’s processing into compliance and the imposition upon LinkedIn of fines totalling €310 million.

LinkedIn lodged an appeal from the DPC’s decision pursuant to s.142 and s.150 of the 2018 Act, along with judicial review proceedings challenging the decision and certain provisions of the Data Protection Act 2018.

Four issues were agreed as appropriate for preliminary trial:

1. Whether LinkedIn was entitled to appeal the DPC decision under s.142 of the 2018 Act or whether aspects of the appeal could only proceed as an appeal under s.150 of the 2018 Act?
2. What type of appeal does s.142 provide for and what is the standard of review or assessment to be applied by the Court in such an appeal?
3. If aspects of the appeal could only proceed under s.150, is the standard of review and assessment the same under s.142 and s.150 or does a different standard apply in an appeal under s.150?
4. Whether LinkedIn was entitled to rely on evidence adduced and/or arguments made in the appeal which were not already adduced or made to the DPC during the inquiry process?

The High Court

At the outset, Ms Justice Cahill noted that as the parties agreed that the same type of appeal and standard of review applied to appeals under s.142 and s.150, the answers to issue 2 would also answer issue 3 and so issue 3 would not be addressed discretely.

The judge explained that the question arising under Issue 1 was whether an appeal under s.142 encompasses the entire DPC decision or whether it is confined to an appeal against the imposition of the fine.

LinkedIn contended that the correct interpretation of the 2018 Act was that when a fine is imposed, the entire decision may be appealed under s.142 and that if there was to be a bifurcation of the appeal, it must be provided for explicitly.

The DPC and the State alleged that s.142 governed only the part of the decision relating to the fine and that this was distinct from the finding of infringement which could only be appealed under s.150(5), having regard to the language of s.142 and the references to “fines” throughout that provision and neighbouring provisions.

Applying the principles set out in Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanala [2022] IESC 43, the court firstly examined the wording of the relevant provisions.

The court concluded that having regard to s.111(2), 112(2) and s.113(4), there are separate decisions as to infringement and as to the exercise of corrective powers and that “the language of these provisions points firmly towards the decision to impose an administrative fine as a discrete decision, distinct from findings of infringement and from the exercise of other corrective powers”.

Ms Justice Cahill identified no ambiguity in the language of s.142, emphasising that it “plainly only applies to a decision to impose an administrative fine and not a decision on infringement under sections 111(1), 112(1) or 113(2)(b)”.

The judge did not agree that the overlap between a decision on infringement and a decision on the imposition of fines would render separate appeals against such decisions impracticable and absurd, noting that the courts are quite accustomed to deciding issues such as liability and quantum in bifurcated hearings.

Ms Justice Cahill further considered that the autonomy of Member States to determine their own procedural rules in legal actions is recognised and respected by the GDPR, subject to compliance with the requirements of effective judicial protection, equivalence and effectiveness.

Accordingly, the judge concluded that s.142 provides solely for an appeal from a decision to impose a fine, and that a decision finding an infringement of the GDPR or as to the exercise of other corrective powers under the 2018 Act could not be appealed under s.142.

As to issue 2, Ms Justice Cahill considered inter alia that the breadth of the court’s powers under s.142, “particularly the fact that the court can supplant not just the outcome but the decision of the DPC without limitation or reservation”, points towards a more fulsome appeal than an appeal against error, and that the formulation of s.142 strongly indicates a free-standing and “wholly untrammelled” power of the court to make its own decision as to the just and appropriate outcome, rather than a power to merely vary the fine.

Accordingly, Ms Justice Cahill determined that the form of appeal provided for in s.142 is an appeal on the record, with the possibility of the admission of new evidence or argument given the terms of s.142(2).

The judge was also satisfied that it is a matter for the judge at trial to assess whether and to what extent the threshold for affording deference to the DPC on issues within its specific technical expertise has been met, agreeing with the DPC that “deference has its place and needs to be assessed on an issue-by-issue basis”.

Deciding that the answer to issue 2 applied equally to an appeal under s.150(5), the court then addressed issue 4.

Turning to the construction of the language used in the 2018 Act, Ms Justice Cahill explained that “it is plain that the Oireachtas specifically contemplates that new evidence and argument may be admitted in an appeal under section 142, but makes no such express provision for appeals under section 150”.

However, the court disagreed with the DPC’s assertion that the court’s discretion to admit new evidence is excluded by s.150, finding that it would be “far-reaching for the Oireachtas to legislate to remove any discretion on the part of the court to admit new evidence or argument in an appeal and questions of compatibility with the ECHR may well arise if there was such a blanket prohibition”.

Accordingly, Ms Justice Cahill determined that it is within the discretion of the court to determine whether to admit new evidence or argument in an appeal under s.150(5).

Conclusion

In the circumstances, the High Court listed the matter before her again for matters related to the question of costs.

LinkedIn Ireland Unlimited Company v Data Protection Commission [2026] IEHC 235