High Court: Challenge to refusal of certificate of naturalisation fails
The High Court has determined that the Minister for Justice was not required to consider the exercise of the discretion conferred by section 16 of the Irish National and Citizenship Act 1956 without any specific request to do so.
About this case:
- Citation:[2026] IEHC 676
- Judgment:
- Court:High Court
- Judge:Ms Justice Nessa Cahill
Delivering an ex tempore judgment for the High Court, Ms Justice Nessa Cahill explained, “The Minister clearly has a discretion under section 16 but cannot be faulted for not exercising that discretion nor can a decision be quashed for failure to do so in the absence of any application or request to the Minister to exercise that discretion.”
Background
On 13 August 2018, the applicant, a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo and mother of four Irish citizen children, applied for a certificate of naturalisation pursuant to section 15 of the Irish National and Citizenship Act 1956.
Section 12 of the relevant form stated “if your application is based on your Irish descent or Irish associations, please give details below”. Irish associations was defined therein as “being related by blood affinity or adoption to or being the civil partner of an Irish citizen”.
In filling out that section of the form, the applicant simply wrote the letters “N/A” to indicate that this was “not applicable”.
On 9 April 2025, the Minister decided to refuse the application based on a recommendation made to the Minister which set out inter alia that the onus rests on applicants to disclose all appropriate information to demonstrate that they satisfy the conditions for a certificate of naturalisation, including that they are of good character.
The recommendation identified certain road traffic offences committed by the applicant which, taken together, were not considered to merit a finding that the applicant satisfied the good character criteria, including failing to display a current vehicle licence, failing to display an insurance certificate, not having insurance, driving without a driving licence, and failing to produce a driving licence upon request.
The applicant obtained leave to seek judicial review, on grounds that insofar as the decision was based on the applicant not being of good character, the Minister failed to consider the exercise of his discretion pursuant to section 16 of the 1956 Act to waive the statutory criteria, and that if the Minister did exercise that discretion, he failed to provide reasons and/or adequate reasons.
Section 16(1) of the 1956 Act provides inter alia that the Minister may in his absolute discretion grant an application for a certificate of naturalisation in certain circumstances despite the conditions for naturalisation or any of them not having been complied with, including where the applicant is of Irish descent or Irish associations.
In the statement of opposition, the Minister asserted that the applicant’s grounds were misconceived where she had not submitted an application based on “Irish associations” pursuant to s.16 of the 1956 Act.
In the circumstances, Ms Justice Cahill considered that the primary issue for the court was whether the Minister was obliged to consider the exercise of the discretion conferred by section 16 of the 1956 Act without any application or specific request to do so by the applicant.
The High Court
Ms Justice Cahill set out the relevant legislative provisions and caselaw, finding the conclusions in Martins v The Minister for Justice [2018] IEHC 268 to be of “direct and real significance” to the proceedings before her.
In Martins, the High Court rejected the arguments of Mr Martins, an unsuccessful applicant for naturalisation, on the basis that the Irish citizenship of his mother had been brought to the Minister’s attention, that he had requested that his application be considered under the section 15 naturalisation conditions and not as an application for waiver of any such conditions he could not meet under section 16, and that, having decided to reject an application for failure to comply with the conditions under section 15, the Minister was not then to consider separately and expressly whether to waive the said conditions under section 16.
Ms Justice Cahill considered that there was no valid basis to distinguish the judgment in Martins and that “the same conclusion falls to be drawn in this case.”
The judge opined that it had not been demonstrated that there was an onus on the Minister to consider whether to exercise a discretion under section 16 when the application for naturalisation was made solely under section 15.
Highlighting that there could be a “real danger” of prejudice to an applicant if the Minister did proceed to consider and reject an application under section 16 without having been requested to do so and without prior notice, the High Court was satisfied that the 1956 “is formulated so as to allow for a section 15 application to be determined and an applicant may then apply separately under section 16.”
Ms Justice Cahill clarified that “while I do not consider the Minister to be bound by a duty to proceed to consider section 16 of his own volition, I do not consider that the Minister could not do so in an appropriate case but I do consider that the right of fair procedure to the applicant would need to be respected”.
Acknowledging that the form used by the applicant in 2018 could have been more explicit as to the rights of an applicant to apply for a waiver under section 16 as an alternative to a primary application under section 15, the judge outlined that if it is the case that the two application processes are being treated as distinct applications, “then perhaps there ought to be a separate form for an application under section 16.”
The court also had regard to the considerable delay of six years and eight months on part of the Minister in delivering the impugned decision and the concern raised by the applicant that there could be a delay of approximately 30 months for a decision on an application under section 16, noting that if the applicant were to apply under section 16, “I would hope that this could be dealt with promptly by the Minister, particularly given the history of delay in this matter to date.”
Conclusion
Accordingly, the High Court refused the relief sought by the applicant, but in light of the Minister’s delay and the lack of clarity on the applicable form, made no order as to costs.
Bibiche Lungela v The Minister for Justice [2026] IEHC 676


