Court of Appeal: Jury should have been discharged upon inadvertent disclosure of accused’s previous imprisonment

About this case:

• Judgment:
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Delivering the judgment of the three-judge Court, Mr Justice Alan Mahon ruled that the trial judge should have discharged the jury after a witness inadvertently disclosed that the man had previously been in prison on more than one occasion. Given the significant prejudicial effect of this inadmissible evidence, this could not be sufficiently countered by the trial judge directing the jury not to take it into account.

Background

In October 2013, following a 14 day trial in Limerick Circuit Criminal Court, a jury was unanimous in convicting Mr Zachary Coughlan Ryan on two counts of false imprisonment contrary to s. 15 of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997

In January 2014, Mr Coughlan-Ryan was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years and three months – which were directed to be served consecutively to a two year prison sentence for a separate offence.

On day 12 of the trial, in the course of the prosecution examining a witness, Ms Tara Troy, the prosecution asked the witness when she had first met Mr Coughlan-Ryan – to which she responded “whenever he got out of jail the last time.”

Prior to this point in the trial, the jury was unaware that Mr Coughlan-Ryan had any previous record or had been imprisoned.

Following this evidence being given to the jury, counsel for Mr Coughlan-Ryan applied to the trial judge to discharge the jury.

The basis for the application to discharge the jury was that their minds had been tainted by the revelation of the fact that Mr Coughlan-Ryan had previously been in prison on more than one occasion, and that such evidence was seriously prejudicial to him and rendered a fair trial impossible.

While the trial judge acknowledged that the witness “should not have said” that Mr Coughlan-Ryan had been in prison – he was satisfied that this remark was not invited by the prosecution, and therefore refused to discharge the jury. Instead, the trial judge directed the jury to “ignore it and not put any reliance on it” in their consideration of the case.

Court of Appeal

Mr Coughlan-Ryan sought to appeal his false imprisonment conviction on the grounds that:

Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Mr Justice Alan Mahon stated that oral submissions were heard in respect of the first ground only, and that his judgment therefore related only to that ground.

Inadmissible evidence

Justice Mahon accepted that inadmissible evidence found its way “into many trials, usually accidently and inadvertently”; and that “its prejudicial effect will vary from case to case, obviously very much depending on what has been stated to the jury or how it might be interpreted by the jury”.

As such, Justice Mahon explained that “a jury should only be discharged where the prejudicial effect is significant and it is not possible to counter that prejudicial effect by suitably warning or directing the jury”.

King v. A.G. IR 233; DPP v. Keogh 4 I.R. 416; and R v. Hope and Another 2WCA Crim, considered, Justice Mahon stated that the Court was satisfied that the “prejudicial effect of the words spoken by Ms Troy was significant”.

The fact the remarks were a reference to Mr Coughlan-Ryan having been in prison more than once was of considerable concern, creating “a real risk that the jury would, notwithstanding the strength of any judicial instruction to the contrary, approach its consideration of a verdict on the basis either that was not a person of previous good character or had been to prison on more than one occasion for serious offences”.

According to Justice Mahon, there was the added factor that the “inadmissible evidence came at a very late stage in a very lengthy trial and shortly before the jury retired to consider its verdict, so that the matter may still have been fresh in their minds”.

In the circumstances the Court of Appeal concluded that the jury ought to have been discharged in the wake of the inadmissible evidence – the appeal was therefore allowed on ground one and Mr Coughlan-Ryan’s conviction was quashed, pending submissions as to whether or not a retrial is to be ordered.